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Abstract  
CO2 Capture Ready Process, as a part of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technology, is a response to international political pressure 
and the priority of the European Commission to reduce anthropogenic CO2 emissions since it is connected with concerns regarding global 
warming. This is currently considered as an option for lessing CO2 emissions into the atmosphere. Many laboratory experiments, as well 
as pilot projects, have been carried out using different capture systems, but until now no experience from the one-to-one size operational 
installation has been gained. The energy industry must meet several challenges associated with the start-up of the new full-scale project. 
This paper investigates the problems that can occur while linking a new technology like the CO2 Capture Ready Process to a working 
fossil fuel power plant. A Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP) has been used, as it is a structured and systematic examination of  
a planned or existing process or operation, in order to identify and evaluate problems that may represent risks to personnel or equipment. 
A case study of a post-combustion CO2 capture system with an aqueous monoethanolamine as a solvent is presented, as it is the most 
likely system to be used in Polish power plants. Basic problems in the analysis as well as the parameters that should be considered to 
determine vulnerabilities of the process were successfully identified. Gaining experience about the installation’s behaviour while 
connected to the existing equipment of any power plant is critical for future CCS projects. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of CO2 Capture Ready Process, as  
a part of CCS technology, is to reduce carbon dioxide emis-
sions into the atmosphere. Many projects that retrofit an  
existing power plant with a CO2 Capture Ready Process in-
stallation are currently being conducted, among them a few 
large pilot facilities (Global CCS Institute 2013) using differ-
ent capture systems, but until now no experience from a full 
size operational installation has been gained. Beginning  
a new full-scale project seems to be a great challenge for the 
energy industry. By building or modifying facilities to be 
Capture Ready we are trying to reduce the amount of carbon 
dioxide emissions using one of the three leading systems  
for capturing CO2 from power generation, that is: pre-
combustion, oxy-fuel combustion or post-combustion.  
All new technologies should be investigated with special 
care, considering that the lack of information regarding pre-
vious incidents or accidents may be a great challenge for an 
evaluation team. Carrying out any study about CO2 Capture 
Ready installation is time-consuming and very demanding 
because it should be done with a stong emphasis on engineer-
ing details. The main problem is limited knowledge concern-
ing some technical aspects of the full size installation. Data is 
available from demonstration facilities, but those projects are 
far too small to provide an answer regarding full-scale plant 
problems. Gaining experience about the installation’s beha-
viour while connected to the existing equipment of any power 
plant can be critical for future CO2 Capture Ready Process 
projects. All this should lead not only to identifying problems 
while constructing and operating Capture Ready installations, 
but also to evaluate the level of risk for any identified devia-
tion, as well as to find credible ways in which they could be 
overcome. 
The main goal of the risk assessment is to identify all pos-
sible hazards that can appear within the system. They are not 
only essential to the system itself, but also they may have 
much wider influence, for example to the environment. Car-
rying out the research should give us an answer concerning 
all possible operability problems within the system. This 
seems to be quite demanding, especially considering that in 
the first step of the study all relevant information about the 
system must be carefully collected. Identifying hazards, ana-
lysing and evaluating the risks are the first steps towards 
successfully managing risk. This is the way to eliminate 
problems arising from the design or, in case it is impossible, 
to reduce the magnitude of risks caused by them. Any organi-
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zation has to establish its own risk criteria, based on the expe-
rience of its working team and some other external indicators 
of possible hazards that may have the potential to cause nega-
tive consequences to the system. In this way unacceptable 
risks can be found and consequently the right solutions can 
be applied either by fundamental design changes or by 
providing protection measures (Macdonald 2004).  
2. RISK ASSESSMENT 
Risk assessment is the first step to prevent incidents or ac-
cidents within technical processes. It is important to deter-
mine all possible deviations in the system’s performance that 
may lead to a risk (Macdonald 2004). This process can be 
divided in three main steps: risk identification, risk analysis 
and risk evaluation, being the most crucial part of the risk 
management process as shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Contribution of risk assessment to the risk management process. 
Based on ISO/IEC 31010 (2010) and PN-N-18002 (2011) 
The most important step within the risk assessment pro-
cess is to correctly choose an appropriate method to define 
potential problems. The variety of techniques to identify 
potential hazards is wide, from checklists to Preliminary 
Hazard Analysis (PHA), Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Hazard and Opera-
bility study (HAZOP), among others. Some of them are use-
ful when there is not a lot information readily available about 
the process. On the other hand, techniques like HAZOP re-
quire more information regarding the system under consid-
eration (BSI 61882, 2001), being more detailed and time 
consuming, but in some cases, especially when considering  
a new technology, remaining indispensable in order to repel 
threats to the success of a new project.  
The right selection of the appropriate tool should be pre-
ceded by the definition of the main goal of each study. If  
a less detailed analysis is needed and we have limited access 
to information, a PHA may be the best solution, as it still 
gives an overview of the problem and it is quite easy to con-
duct. If the nature of the process is under consideration then 
FMEA is a good option, as it gives an answer regarding all 
possible interactions between different parts of the system; 
FTA should be used when focusing on specific problems 
related to the technology, like the possibility of explosion, 
fire or other critical events which may appear. When a de-
tailed and comprehensive study is needed to guarantee that all 
hazards, together with all deviations and operability prob-
lems, are identified and we have access to the technical in-
formation about the system like the Piping and Instrumenta-
tion Diagram (P&ID), then the best solution seems to be 
HAZOP (BSI 61882 2001). 
A systematic approach to the problem seems to be the big-
gest advantage of the HAZOP technique, known as a diag-
nostic tool from the late 1960s and still used for the identifi-
cation of operational disturbances and deviations within the 
systems. Over the years, the main HAZOP approach has not 
changed, but the way of identifying potential operability 
problems was developed by finding new applications within 
many industries like power generation, mineral processing 
and mining. HAZOP, if correctly applied, may indicate and 
prevent possible deviations in the operation of a processing 
plant, but can also cover unusual circumstances of the system 
such as start-up, shutdown and plant maintenance. The first 
step within the HAZOP study is to analyse the P&ID of the 
process in order to divide it into specific portions called 
“nodes”, where all parameters describing the system can be 
identified. It is important to describe the essential features of 
the plant items, to explain the intended methods of operations 
and to prepare a process flow chart, so that the study team 
can improve their understanding of the process dynamics. 
This part of the study is crucial because any mistake at the 
early stage of HAZOP can strongly influence the overall 
analysis. The next step is to combine a series of guidewords 
with each parameter to create deviations and to capture most 
of the causes that may lead to risky situations. This is also  
a good opportunity to identify the possible consequences of 
each deviation and to discuss among the evaluation team 
safeguards and recommendations to prevent those events. 
What is more visible at this stage of the study is that the re-
sult of HAZOP depends more upon the experience and atti-
tudes of the team than on the procedures themselves (BSI 
61882, 2001; Kletz 1999). It is important to conduct analysis 
with the support of experts from the organization who may 
provide information about possible problems in the system’s 
operation.  
But what to do when a system does not exist and it is still 
in an investigation phase? This is the right moment to imple-
ment a HAZOP approach to check if the P&ID was correctly 
prepared and to study all possible deviations that may appear 
within the future system’s operation. Strong support of an 
interdisciplinary group of experts is needed, so that all possi-
ble problems with the initial design can be identified. Also 
laboratory test and demonstrational projects, although deve-
loped in a smaller scale compared with the industrial needs 
would be a good source of information concerning process 
behaviour and the complications which may appear with its 
application to a full scale project. 
3. POST-COMBUSTION AND AMINE-BASED CO2 
CAPTURE READY PROCESS 
Chemical absorption processes based on organic solvents 
such as amines are currently the preferred option for post-
combustion CO2 capture. The most widely-studied solvent 
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for post-combustion CO2 capture is an aqueous solution of 
monoethanolamine (MEA) (Abu-Zahra et al. 2007; Amann, 
Bouallou 2009; Global CCS Report 2012; Harun et al. 2012; 
IPCC 2005; Johnson, Reddy, Brown 2009; Notz, 
Mangalapally, Hasse 2012; Rao, Rubin, Berkenpas 2004; 
Reddy, Gilmartin 2008; Sønderby et al. 2013; Tenaska 2012). 
Systems using commercially available chemical solvents like 
MEA (mostly 30 wt % solution), with inhibitors to prevent 
degradation and equipment corrosion, are the best near-term 
option for CO2 capture from power plants.  
In general we can say that in a post-combustion system, 
CO2 is captured from flue gas by passing it through equip-
ment which separates most of the CO2. The biggest advan-
tage of this system is its ability to capture the carbon dioxide 
at the end of the flue gas production chain. In this way it is 
possible to retrofit any existing power plant with a capture 
unit. There are several commercially available process tech-
nologies which can be used for CO2 capture from flue gases: 
chemical absorption, physical absorption, adsorption (pres-
sure/temperature swing), gas membrane separation and cryo-
genic distillation (IEAGHG 2012). In Poland the most likely 
to be used in the near future is one based on chemical absorp-
tion, it was used in the Bełchatów Project which although 
was cancelled due to economic problems, had a great chance 
to be the first full scale CO2 Capture Ready Installation.  
Among the most commercially available technologies for 
chemical absorption of CO2 the following five should be 
mentioned: Fluor’s Econamine FG+, Mitsubishi Heavy In-
dustries KS solvent, Cansolv Technologies, Aker Clean Car-
bon and Alstom’s Chilled Ammonia Process (Global CCS 
Report 2012; IPCC 2005). In this paper we will focus on 
Capture Ready Post-Combustion Process based on aqueous 
MEA (30 wt % solution) as a solvent (Fig. 2), where CO2 is 
removed from flue gas stream at low-pressure. 
 
 
Figure 2. Simplified Amine “Capture Ready” Process flow diagram based on (Sanpasertparnich et al. 2010) 
In the first step of this process flue gas from the Flue-Gas 
Desulfurization (FGD) unit is delivered to the cooler where it 
is cooled by circulating water at a temperature of about 40°C 
(other parameters of this process are presented in Table 1). In 
case of a high level of impurities in the flue gas, which may 
contain SO2 and SO3, it is necessary to scrub it by using  
a desulfurizing solution. The flue gas exits through the top of 
the cooler and is sent to a blower where it is slightly com-
pressed. Then the gas enters at the bottom of the absorber, 
while at the same time MEA enters at the top of the absorber. 
CO2 is removed from the feed gas by the lean amine solvent. 
Treated flue gas, consisting mainly of N2 and O2, is washed 
with a circulating water stream before leaving through the top 
of the absorber. When the amine stream is loaded with CO2, 
as it is the case with the stream that leaves through the bot-
tom of the absorber, it is known as rich amine stream. The 
rich amine stream leaves from the bottom of the absorber and 
it is pumped to the cross-heat exchanger in order to exchange 
the heat with the lean stream from the desorber. Then the lean 
stream is further cooled, bringing its temperature down to 
around 40°C and it proceeds to the absorber. By that time  
a rich amine enters at the second stage of the desorber and 
flows down the column, going in the direction of the vapours 
from the reboiler. The overhead vapour from the desorber is 
cooled and most of the water is condensed out of the low 
pressure CO2 product. The majority of the condensed water 
reflux returns to the top of the desorber, while the balance 
returns to the absorber. The remaining low pressure CO2 
product is routed to the compression section (Reddy, 
Gilmartin 2008; Sanpasertparnich et al. 2010; Tenaska 2012). 
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Table 1. Basic parameters of a post-combustion process based on MEA 
No Component 
Pressure 
[kPa] 
Temperature 
[oC] 
Flow rate 
[kg/s] 
Medium 
a 
Pipeline from the FGD 
unit to the cooler 
101 45 725 
Flue gas before 
CO2 removal 
b1 Absorber 109 40 – Flue gas + amine 
b2 Absorber 109 57 – Flue gas + amine 
c 
Pipeline with rich amine 
to cross-heat exchanger 
109 57 3009 Rich amine 
d1 
Pipeline from cross-heat 
exchanger to desorber 
109 107 3009 Rich amine 
d2 
Pipeline from cross-heat 
exchanger to desorber 
109 103 3009 Rich amine 
e1 Desorber 186 103 - Amine + CO2 
e2 Desorber 186 123 - Amine + CO2 
f 
Pipeline from reflux drum 
to compressor 
183 40 151 CO2 
g 
Pipeline from reboiler  
to cross-heat exchanger 
109 123 2858 Lean amine 
h 
Pipeline from cross-heat 
exchanger to lean amine 
cooler 
109 67 2858 Lean amine 
4. THE USE OF HAZOP FOR RISK ASSESSMENT  
OF CO2 CAPTURE READY PROCESS
According to the USA Standard for process safety manage-
ment (OSHA 1910.119, 1992), a Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
technique (PHA) is recommended for certain types of chemical 
facilities. This is way it has become a widely accepted tech-
nique for other industrial processes as “CO2 Capture Ready” 
installations, although they are not mentioned within this regu-
lation. This technique seems to be a good option for planned 
facilities but in some cases it may not be sufficient while ana-
lysing a new technology. That is why a HAZOP study might 
be a better and more effective solution. HAZOP analysis iden-
tifies the potential operability problems, but also other safety 
related risks as well as environmental hazards, which is the 
great added value of this study (Tenaska 2012). 
While conducting a HAZOP analysis of the installation, 41 
parts (nodes) were identified. All of them were reviewed in 
sequential order following a P&ID, so possible problems 
with the intended design would be found; equipment failures 
and safety hazards among them. The most important system 
parameters taken into account were: temperature, pressure, 
flow rate, material corrosion, composition, integrity and ma-
terial properties.
Some of the possible deviations identified within the study 
are mentioned below, showing the complexity of the problem:
material corrosion, resulting from the use of wrongly
selected material, not resistant to monoethanolamine cor-
rosive properties and CO2 influence. Some cases of valves 
corrosion – due to the lack of stainless steel usage - are 
known from post-combustion  tests, as well as some trac-
es of condensation that were observed within the CAS-
TOR project (Kittel et al. 2006), demonstrating that at a 
specific height in the gas pipeline a risk of local corrosion 
can appear (the corrosion rate of carbon steel was consid-
erable in the “lean amine areas”, at the outlet of the de-
sorbed and at the inlet of the absorber); 
monoethanolamine degradation: 
– carbamate polymerization is the most common mecha-
nism of amine degradation and it may appear in the de-
sorber and in the reboiler with the presence of CO2 and 
high temperature (over 100°C) 
– oxidative degradation leads to the formation of high 
molecular weight degradation products (Goff, Rochelle 
2004). It can appear in the absorber when O2 concen-
tration in the flue gas is over 5% or when heat stable 
solids are formed (Davidson 2007; Yu, Huang, Tan
2012). The degradation could be mainly catalysed by 
the presence of iron and copper but also by nickel and 
chromium (Goff, Rochelle 2003)
– thermal degradation leads to the formation of high mo-
lecular weight degradation products. It only takes place 
around the desorber, the cross-heat exchanger or the 
reboiler, where temperature is above 205°C (Davidson, 
2007)
decrease of flow rate or lack of flow rate to the absorber, 
both flue gas and MEA, caused by a pipeline blockage, an 
equipment failure or human error  
loss of solvent and/or flue gas, as a consequence of pipe-
line leakage 
overflow or reversed flow due to human errors or equip-
ment failures (valves, pumps etc.) 
increase of pressure caused by an excessive accumulation 
of gas within the system (for example, caused by a gas 
outlet obstruction in the absorber)
change in the flue gas composition (high level of impuri-
ties) as a consequence of a gas supply system failure or 
pipeline corrosion 
Some other examples of “nodes” taken into consideration 
together with deviations analysed by the experts’ team are 
presented in Figure 3. While conducting a HAZOP study the 
main problem which has to be overcome is the need to demon-
strate system capabilities in a power plant setting where the 
quantities of CO2 to be captured are typically several times 
larger than at any currently operating demonstration plant.
Figure 3. Example of a HAZOP worksheet for some elements  
of a post-combustion and amine-based CO2 Capture Ready Process 
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Also we must remember that an amine-based post-
combustion system may introduce a number of environmental 
risks that must be evaluated. They could result from process 
emissions to the air and land, but also from big system 
changes in mass and energy flows when a capture unit is 
added to a power plant (IRGC 2009).  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
CCS technology is relatively young and is of interest to 
many researchers all over the world, but is still being devel-
oped within a process of technology changes. Many laborato-
ry experiments, as well as pilot projects, have been under-
taken using different capture systems, but until now no expe-
rience from full-size operational installations has been 
gained. The energy industry must meet several challenges 
associated with the start-up of new full-scale projects, which 
may introduce new technical problems. Most of them are 
related with the properties of the materials used and the tech-
nologies applied, and can be identified at the first stage of the 
project if the appropriate tool is implemented. That is why  
a HAZOP analysis seems to be a good option for identifying 
potential operability problems and further risk assessment, as 
industrial process operations are never completely risk-free. 
The main goal of any risk assessment is to identify all pos-
sible failures of the intended design, so that safeguards and 
actions required for improving the safety of the process could 
be implemented when scaling up the technology to a con-
structible design at a commercial size. All this can only be 
done properly in the context of a particular power plant, em-
ploying a specific Capture Ready Technology. Although it 
seems that Capture Ready Technology has little potential to 
cause major hazards both to the environment and humans, at 
the same time the complexity of the process and the specific 
instrumentation introduce a wide range of possible deviations 
in the operation of a full-size plant. This makes a HAZOP 
analysis very complex and time-consuming, but it is the only 
approach to guarantee that everything possible was done to 
prevent accidents and other harmful consequences. 
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